Digital ngerprinting aims at protecting multimedia contents from illegal redistribution by embedding imperceptible ngerprints identifying the users. We propose two approaches for building ngerprinting codes that accommodate millions of users and resist tens of colluders. These approaches are based on recent information-theoretic analyses of good ngerprinting codes in two regimes: 1) very low rates, and 2) rates near capacity. Good low-rate codes have high minimum distance. Good high-rate codes are short and random-like. Simulation results are presented to assess decoding performance.
INTRODUCTION
Digital ngerprinting aims at protecting multimedia contents from illegal redistribution by embedding imperceptible ngerprints identifying the users. Some users may collude and construct a pirated copy, or forgery, and illegally redistribute it. To deter them from doing this, one needs to be able to trace the pirated copy back to at least one of the pirates (colluders). The colluders may use various attacks to thwart detection of their ngerprints from the pirated copy. A popular one is averaging of the colluders' copies. Another one is interleaving, where each colluder contributes parts of his marked copy to construct the pirated copy. Following the averaging or interleaving operation, the pirates may add low-level noise to further impair detectability of their ngerprints without degrading content quality too much. While noise-resilient codes exist, it remains a challenging research problem to design tracing algorithms that are robust against collusion attacks and have reasonably low execution time, especially when the number of users is large.
In the literature, two distinct frameworks have been used to build collusion-resistant ngerprinting codes. The rst one relies on the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption. Examples include Reed-Solomon based codes [1, 2, 3] and anti-collusion codes [4] . For media ngerprinting however, the marking assumption is less natural than a distortion assumption which limits the amount of distortion that the ngerprint distributor and the colluders are allowed to introduce.
For real-valued signals, optimal ngerprinting codes built under the distortion framework are known when M , the number of users, does not exceed N + 1, the ngerprint codelength. The optimal codes are simplex codes and their performance is asymptotically equal to that of orthogonal codes for large N [5] . When M > N + 1, no such simple solution exists. Most codes developed in ngerprinting literature have large minimum distance [1, 2, 3, 6, 7] . Recent results [8] have established optimality properties of this approach at low rates, in the following sense. Let R = 1 N log 2 M be the rate of the ngerprinting code. Denote by C the ngerprinting capacity, i.e., the supremum of achievable rates. If R > C, it is impossible to reliably detect even one colluder. For Gaussian hosts and Euclidean distortion metrics, capacity is a function of SNR (the ratio of ngerprint power to colluder noise power) and of the number K of colluders [9] :
It is thus theoretically possible to catch at least one colluder with low error probability if R < C and N is large enough. When R/C → 0, expurgated spherical codes (which have large minimum distance) are optimal [8] . Motivated by this result, we have designed a family of modulated ngerprinting codes based on maximum-distance separable algebraic codes. These codes can accommodate an exponential number of users, admit ef cient decoding algorithms, and their traceability properties can be theoretically estimated. These codes have low rate and thus long ngerprints (for a given M ).
However, in media ngerprinting, short ngerprints are valuable because there are relatively few media features in which they can be robustly embedded. This suggests developing high-rate codes, where R potentially approaches C. For such codes what matters is not the minimal distance, but the global distribution of the ngerprints. Since nonexpurgated random-like codes are capacity-achieving, this motivated us to develop ngerprinting codes based on this idea. This paper present both the low-rate and the high-rate codes discussed above and compare their performance with existing codes in the literature.
LOW-RATE FINGERPRINTING
Expurgated spherical codes have high minimum distance and are theoretically excellent for low-rate ngerprinting [8] . In order to design a code that can accommodate many users, we recently proposed the following construction [10] . We chose a [n, k] Reed-Solomon outer code over the Galois eld GF(q) with dimension k n and maximal length n = q − 1. This code is modulated onto an orthonormal q-dimensional constellation. The length of the code is N = qn and the number of users it can accommodate is M = q k . We hard decoded the inner code and used the state-ofthe-art Guruswami-Sudan [11] decoding algorithm which has the capacity to correct as many as
The level of noise we can handle depends on how tight the inequality is and also on how the inner code is decoded. We assessed the performance of this code against the averaging attack with SNR = 1. The number of Monte Carlo simulations performed ranged from 350 to 1,040 depending on the experiment. In the table below, d min is the normalized minimal distance of the code (would be 2 for orthogonal codes),P e represents the probability that no colluder is caught, andP all e represents the probability that not all colluders are caught. The code of length N = 4032 bits can accommodate a large amount of users (M = 262, 144) and resist 3 colluders. This code is shorter than the code given in [4] and supports many more users for the same collusion resistance.
The code with the same parameters but 33,554,432 users can resits 2 colluders. Note that [6, 7] also used ngerprinting codes based on a Reed-Solomon inner code but did not use the Guruswami-Sudan decoding algorithm. The decoder of [6] uses brute-force search, which is manageable only if M is small.
In ngerprinting problems, the goal is generally to catch only one of the colluders, and this is whatP e measures. Catching all colluders is far more dif cult, especially if they do not contribute equally. We notice from the results, that the value ofP all e is only a little higher thanP e meaning that in most cases we can identify all the colluders. Our code has a very low rate in comparison to the capacity of the collusion attack channel, justifying the use of codes with high minimum distance as outer and inner code. If the goal is to catch only one of the colluders then C is given by (1).
If we have q = 2 m where m ∈ N and if our goal is to catch only one of the colluders, then the code is K-resilient if
We see from (2) that R C. The ratio C/R is dominated by 2 m−1 which is close to q = 2 m when m is large. We need to have large q if we want to accommodate many users or to be resilient to large coalitions. For instance, for K = 3, m = 6 and k = 3, we have a code of length N = 31×32 = 4032 bits and rate R = 0.0045, accomodating M = 64 3 = 262, 144 users. From (1) we obtain C = 0.069 ≈ 15R. The codes with high minimum distance are optimal when R C. The numerical results above suggest that our construction is in this regime. It is thus a good idea to use a Reed-Solomon code (which is maximum distance separable) as outer code, and an orthonormal code as inner code.
To summarize, the above construction gives a low-rate code. The decoder is able to identify at least one of the colluders and often all of the colluders against averaging attacks with low error probability. However, when the number of colluders increases, we need very long codewords to resist the collusion which makes it dif cult to embed the ngerprint into a multimedia content, and dramatically increases the execution time of the Guruswami-Sudan decoding algorithm. This limitation motivates the approach described next.
HIGH-RATE FINGERPRINTING
Perhaps motivated by codes designed under the marking assumption, most authors have focused on the design of codes with high minimum distance. For signal ngerprinting however, this approach is optimal only if the code rate is much lower than capacity. At rates close to the capacity, the overall distribution of the ngerprints is what matters. Therefore, we propose the following design of a random-like ngerprinting code. Preliminary results were reported in [12] .
Each user is identi ed by a bitstring of length n = log 2 M . First, the bitstring is encoded with a recursive systematic convolutional (RSC) code of rate R 1 which gives a binary subcodeword of size n/R 1 . Then, it is interleaved and encoded with the same or another RSC code of rate R 2 which yields a different subcodeword of size n/R 2 . This last operation is repeated a total of N i times. At the end, the N i + 1 subcodewords generated are concatenated to form a ngerprint of size N = n
The number of users that can be accommodated is M = 2 n , and the rate of the ngerprinting code is R = 1 This code does not have a high minimum distance but the introduction of random interleavers makes the N i + 1 subcodewords uncorrelated; thus we gain by exchanging information after decoding each subcodeword. Moreover, we can use different polynomial generators g i in each branch to increase diversity.
To decode a codeword, we rst retrieve separately the subcodewords {r i } and decode them with a list Viterbi decoding algorithm outputting a list L i of size D. Our simulations showed that, usually, one list contains one or many colluders but their subcodewords are not at the top of the list because the forgery is closer to the subcodeword of an innocent user. However, by comparing the users accused in each list, we gain reliability. Once all subcodewords have been decoded, we take the union of the N i + 1 lists L i to get a nal list L f . Among all the users in the nal list, we run a matched lter to select the ngerprint that has the highest correlation with the forgery. This algorithm aims at catching only one of the pirates.
The binary ngerprint is made of blocks of size n/R i . To map the binary ngerprint to a vector in R N , we applied the discrete cosine transform (DCT) to each block and concatenated the resulting DCT coef cients. We chose the DCT because it is fast to compute and suitable for robust embedding.
We assessed the performance of this code against averaging attack followed by additive white Gaussian noise with 100 Monte-Carlo simulations. In our simulations, we targeted 30 millions users and a coalition of about 50 colluders. The parameters of the code are chosen to meet these requirements and we determine the collusion resistance through simulations. For all the experiments, we chose the same rate R 1 for the polynomial generators g i . In some cases, we even used the same polynomial generator to encode all the subcodewords. The table below lists the code rate R, the ratio C/R obtained from (1), and the probabilityP e that the algorithm accuses an innocent user. 1.24 0 (3) 1 0.022 3.14 0 Table 2 . Results obtained for the high-rate ngerprinting code. For all experiments, the number of users is M = 33, 554, 432.P e is the empirical probability that the algorithm accuses an innocent user.
The results are very promising. We are able to accommodate millions of colluders and resist collusion of about 50 colluders with a very low probability of errorP e . For comparison, Trappe et al. [4] used a code of length 10, 000 accommodating 20 users and resiting 3 colluders against the averaging attack. Here, with a code of length N = 1, 160, we accommodate M = 33, 554, 432 users and resist up to 3 colluders. He and Wu [6] used a code of length N = 30, 000 accommodating only 1024 users but resisting up to 25 colluders under interleaving and averaging attacks. Later, they used a joint coding/embedding technique [7] which resists up to 100 colluders against averaging attacks. But the decoding algorithm, which relies on the use of trimming symbols, has complexity O(qN ) and N is extremely large (N = 260 Mbits).
The complexity of our algorithm is dominated by the matched lter which is O(ND (N i + 1) ). In our scheme N is relatively small, making the computations tractable. The list size D is a very important parameter. The larger D is, the larger L f is, and the more accurate the matched lter detection. On the other hand, computational complexity increases. Other than that, using large D is a good way to improve the performance of the code without modifying its length. For a given N/n = (N i + 1)/R 1 , better performance is obtained when R 1 and N i are both small.
To summarize, this code is the ngerprinting code with the highest rate ever proposed for a given number of colluders. Because it is short, it can be embedded easily and efciently into multimedia content. It distinguishes itself from other designs by relying not on minimum distance but on the randomness of the codewords and decoding ef ciency.
Reduction of the probability of false alarm. The decoding algorithm above always accuses a user. But, it is very important not to accuse an innocent user. We present a simple modi cation of our algorithm that reduces the probability of false positives.
First an observation. With K = 3, N = 1, 160, M = 33, 554, 432, N i = 3, R 1 = 1 10 and D = 256, we ran 100 Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the distribution of the correlations of the users's ngerprints in the nal list L f with the forgery. After the decoding, we split L f into two lists: one containing only innocent users and the other one containing colluders. We then computed the correlation of these user's ngerprints with the pirated copy and computed histograms to see how the correlation statistics are distributed for guilty and innocent users. This suggests a simple modi cation of the previous scheme. We choose a threshold and declare a decoding failure if the correlation statistic for the suspect identi ed by the decoding algorithm falls below the threshold. The threshold can be chosen by xing the desired probability of false alarm, e.g., 0.1%.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented two ngerprinting codes. One with low rate and the other one with high rate. The lowrate code is easy to analyze but has long codewords even if it is shorter than other existing ngerprinting codes. The highrate code is short but can accommodate millions of users and tens of colluders. This code operates close to the fundamental capacity limit, so dramatic improvements over this design are unlikely.
